viernes, 18 de octubre de 2019

Nuevos casos contra El Salvador y Nicaragua


Este reporte fue elaborado por Álvaro Paúl Díaz.

La Comisión Interamericana de Derechos Humanos (CIDH) informó sobre la presentación de dos casos ante la Corte Interamericana.  Tales comunicados son los siguientes:

1.  Comunicado 255/19 (10.10.19), Caso 13.069, Manuela y familia, respecto de El Salvador.

Este asunto fue enviado a la Corte el 29 de julio de 2019.  Según el comunicado, el caso “se refiere a una serie de violaciones en el marco del proceso penal que culminó con la condena por el delito de homicidio agravado a la víctima del caso, en el marco del contexto conocido en El Salvador sobre criminalización del aborto. La Comisión determinó que el Estado violó el derecho a la libertad personal por la detención ilegal de la víctima, tomando en cuenta que fue detenida el 28 de febrero de 2008 bajo la figura de flagrancia sin que se llenaran los requisitos para ello, pues en el momento de la detención se encontraba recibiendo asistencia médica en el Hospital Nacional de San Francisco de Gotera.

“Asimismo, la Comisión concluyó que el Estado violó el derecho a no ser privado de libertad arbitrariamente, el principio de presunción de inocencia y el derecho a la protección judicial ya que la decisión de prisión preventiva se impuso tomando en cuenta la gravedad del delito, aplicando una disposición legal que establecía que no procedía la sustitución de la detención provisional por otra medida cautelar en el delito de homicidio agravado.”

La CIDH también declaró la violación de derechos procesales de la presunta víctima.

“Igualmente, la Comisión determinó que el Estado violó el derecho a la vida privada y el derecho a la salud, tomando en cuenta que la regulación del secreto profesional no cumplía con el requisito de legalidad de una restricción, pues no establecía con claridad en que supuestos se configuraban excepciones y en qué casos existía la obligación de denuncia por parte del médico tratante. Además, cierta información proporcionada a las autoridades, como los antecedentes sexuales de la víctima, no guardaba relación con los fines que persigue el deber de denuncia.

“La CIDH también concluyó que el Estado violó el derecho a la vida, el derecho a la salud, las garantías judiciales y protección judicial, tomando en cuenta que la víctima no recibió un diagnóstico médico integral cuando fue privada de libertad, ni tampoco un tratamiento médico oportuno y adecuado, el cual hubiera permitido prolongar la vida de Manuela, quien falleció luego de padecer de una enfermedad cuyos indicios se manifestaron desde 2007. La muerte de la víctima, bajo custodia del Estado, no fue esclarecida mediante una investigación adecuada.

“Finalmente, la Comisión estableció la responsabilidad internacional del Estado por la violación del deber de motivación, presunción de inocencia y el principio de igualdad y no discriminación tomando en cuenta la aplicación de una serie de estereotipos a lo largo del proceso penal, que tuvieron el impacto de cerrar ciertas líneas de investigación e impedir el análisis exhaustivo de la prueba. Algunos estereotipos de género también se encuentran presentes en la sentencia condenatoria, los cuales generaron que el tribunal de conocimiento omitiera valorar con exhaustividad cierta prueba, y tuvieron un impacto en la determinación de la responsabilidad penal.”

2.  Comunicado 257/19 (11.10.19), Caso ‘Opario Lemoth Morris y Otros (Buzos Miskito)’ respecto de Honduras.

Este asunto fue enviado a la Corte el 24 de mayo de 2019.  Según el comunicado, el caso “se relaciona con la afectación de múltiples derechos en perjuicio de un grupo de personas pertenecientes al pueblo indígena Miskito que habitan en el departamento de Gracias a Dios, Honduras. En su Informe de Fondo la Comisión concluyó que el Estado vulneró el derecho a la integridad personal de 34 buzos miskito que sufrieron accidentes debido a las sumersiones profundas que realizaban y que les generaron el síndrome de descompresión.  Asimismo, la CIDH consideró que el Estado violó el derecho a la vida de los doce buzos miskito que fallecieron momentos después de dichos accidentes. Ello en tanto la omisión e indiferencia del Estado frente a la problemática de explotación laboral por parte de empresas pesqueras y la realización del buceo en condiciones peligrosas que dio lugar a dichos accidentes se vio materializada en la falta de fiscalización adecuada.

“Adicionalmente, la CIDH consideró que el Estado hondureño, a pesar de tener conocimiento de la situación de los buzos y la situación perversa de las relaciones laborales en las que se encontraban, no adoptó medidas deliberadas, concretas y orientadas a la realización del derecho al trabajo, a las condiciones justas, equitativas y satisfactorias del mismo, así como a la salud y a la seguridad social.  Además, tomando en cuenta los múltiples factores de vulnerabilidad de las víctimas vinculados a su pertenencia a un pueblo indígena históricamente excluido, en situación de pobreza extrema y siendo muchas víctimas personas con discapacidad, la Comisión consideró que el Estado también es responsable por la violación del principio de igualdad y no discriminación.”


miércoles, 18 de septiembre de 2019

Nuevos casos contra Ecuador y Perú


Este reporte fue elaborado por Álvaro Paúl Díaz.

La Comisión Interamericana de Derechos Humanos (CIDH) informó sobre la presentación de dos casos ante la Corte Interamericana.  Tales comunicados son los siguientes:

1.  Comunicado 223/19 (12.09.19), Caso 11.587, César Gustavo Garzón Guzmán, respecto de Ecuador.

Este asunto fue enviado a la Corte el 26 de julio de 2019.  Según el comunicado, el caso “se relaciona con la desaparición forzada de César Gustavo Garzón Guzmán a partir del 9 de noviembre de 1990 en Quito, Ecuador por parte de miembros de la Policía Nacional. El hecho se dio en un contexto general de desapariciones forzadas por parte de agentes estatales en contra de personas identificadas como subversivas, en particular de los grupos ‘Alfaro Vive Carajo’ y ‘Montoneras Patria Libre’. El caso fue documentado por el informe de la Comisión de la Verdad de Ecuador como una desaparición forzada cometida por la Policía Nacional. La CIDH determinó que existen elementos suficientes para concluir que César Gustavo Garzón Guzmán fue privado de libertad por agentes estatales. Asimismo, concluyó que la negativa de las autoridades a reconocer la detención, en el contexto de la época y tomando en cuenta la prueba obrante en el expediente, constituyó un encubrimiento de los hechos.

“Por otra parte, la Comisión estimó que la hipótesis manejada por el Estado en el marco de la investigación, según la cual la víctima fue sustraída por miembros del grupo subversivo al que pertenecía o que huyó a otro país, coincide con el modus operandi para casos de desapariciones forzadas en el momento de los hechos.

“En particular, respecto de la investigación judicial, la CIDH refirió que todas las investigaciones se reducen a tres partes policiales sin que conste que el Estado haya iniciado e impulsado formalmente una investigación penal transcurridos más de 26 años desde los hechos, por lo que concluyó que el Estado ecuatoriano no ha investigado los hechos del presente caso con la debida diligencia ni en un plazo razonable.

“En el Informe de Fondo, la Comisión concluyó que el Estado es responsable por la violación de los derechos al reconocimiento de la personalidad jurídica, a la vida, a la integridad personal, a la libertad personal, a las garantías judiciales y a la protección judicial previstos en la Convención Americana, así como los artículos I a) y b) de la Convención Interamericana sobre Desaparición Forzada de Personas.”

2.  Comunicado 229/19 (16.09.19), Caso 12.975, Julio Casa Nina, respecto de Perú. 

Este asunto fue enviado a la Corte el 6 de agosto de 2019.  Según el comunicado, el caso “”se refiere a una serie de violaciones en el marco del proceso disciplinario que culminó con la separación de Julio Casa Nina de su cargo de Fiscal Adjunto Provisional de la Segunda Fiscalía Penal de la Provincia de Huamanga Ayacucho, Perú. La Comisión consideró que el Estado violó el derecho a ser oído, el derecho de defensa y el principio de legalidad, tomando en cuenta que el nombramiento de la víctima sin ningún plazo o condición, limitada a una invocación genérica de las necesidades de servicio resultó incompatible con las garantías de estabilidad reforzada que deben proteger a fiscales para ser separados de sus cargos únicamente por incurrir en graves causales disciplinarias o por cumplirse el plazo o condición establecido en su designación. Por otra parte, por la forma en que fue cesada de su cargo, la víctima no contó con un procedimiento que cumpliera con las garantías mínimas que se desprenden del derecho de defensa.

“Adicionalmente, la Comisión consideró que el Estado violó el derecho a contar con decisiones debidamente motivadas y el principio de presunción de inocencia. Al respecto, la Comisión destacó que la decisión que cesó a la víctima de su cargo carece de motivación, y no permite comprender las razones que dieron lugar al cese. Además, en dicha decisión se indica que la misma es “sin perjuicio de las acciones legales que pudiesen ser pertinentes por la queja y la denuncia que se encuentran en trámite”. Tal referencia también fue invocada en la decisión que declaró sin lugar el recurso de reconsideración planteado por la víctima, lo cual afectó el principio de presunción de inocencia.

“La CIDH también concluyó que el Estado violó el derecho a la protección judicial, tomando en cuenta que la víctima hizo uso de un recurso de reconsideración en la vía administrativa, el cual se declaró sin lugar el 14 de febrero de 2003 por la Fiscal de la Nación, indicando que el nombramiento de la víctima era de carácter provisional, asimismo, planteó un amparo ante el Primer Juzgado Especializado en lo Civil de Huamanga, y una apelación contra la decisión que denegó su amparo, sin embargo ninguna de las vías intentadas por la víctima fueron efectivas para impugnar la decisión que lo cesó en su cargo. Finalmente, la Comisión determinó que el Estado violó los derechos políticos de la víctima, los cuales protegen el derecho de acceso y permanencia en condiciones generales de igualdad en un cargo público, tomando en cuenta que la víctima fue separada de su cargo en un procedimiento en el cual no se cumplieron las garantías mínimas requeridas.”


miércoles, 21 de agosto de 2019

Guest Blogger: Recognition of Intersectionality in Femicide and Rape Cases Decided by the IACmHR and the IACtHR

Recognition of Intersectionality in Femicide and Rape Cases Decided by the Inter-American Commission and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights

by Darija Zeljko 


                     I.  Introductory Remarks: Intersectionality and Violence against Women
In this post I will focus on how the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (hereafter: the Commission) and the Inter-American Court (further: the Court or the IACtHR) approach the issue of intersectionality in their decisions which deal with gender-based violence, particularly in femicide and rape cases.
Intersectionality is a concept which was invented by Kimberlé Crenshaw in 1989 when she coined the term in an influential paper ‘Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist Politics.’ In 1991 she was again a pioneer among US scholars in noticing how experiences of black women are often neglected by competent institutions and identity politics (feminism, racism) when it comes to the issue of violence against women. Recently, international and regional human rights bodies are starting to accept intersectionality and develop it within their own frameworks. There exists consensus among academia and international adjudicative bodies that ‘Multiple- or intersectional- inequality describes discrimination that occurs as a result of how these different identities or situations or factors interact.’ (p. 92) In paragraph 18 of its General Recommendation No. 28, the UN’s Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women (further: the CEDAW Committee) recognized that:
The discrimination of women based on sex and gender is inextricably linked with other factors that affect women, such as race, ethnicity, religion or belief, health, status, age, class, caste and sexual orientation and gender identity. Discrimination on the basis of sex or gender may affect women belonging to such groups to a different degree or in different ways to men. States parties must legally recognize such intersecting forms of discrimination and their compounded negative impact on the women concerned and prohibit them. (Emphasis added)
The most dangerous form of discrimination against women is violence against women, as recognized by the CEDAW Committee in its influential General Recommendation No. 19 (1992). Countless examples worldwide show how violence against women may have fatal consequences on women’s life and/or bodily integrity. It follows from the cited CEDAW Committee’s Recommendation that violence against women (as a form of discrimination) is also often inseparable with women’s other identities, such as their age, race, socio-economic status, sexual orientation, etc.
The sad reality for women is that there is no country or continent which we can say is ‘free’ from gender-based violence. Reports clearly show, however, that some forms of violence against women are more prevalent in certain contexts. For example, infamous data confirms that femicide is a widespread problem in the Latin American and Caribbean countries, inasmuch 14 out of 25 countries with the highest rates of femicide are settled there. I mention this because ‘just’ being a woman clearly constitutes a potentially life-threatening risk in Latin America (as in other parts of the world) which is exacerbated if we add further ‘dangerous’ factors such as being poor, young, or of a ‘wrong’ background. When it comes to descent, in Latin America indigenous women are in a specific vulnerable position. Their vulnerability to certain forms of gender-based violence exists even in the most developed of the OAS countries, such as Canada. Therefore, the Commission with a reason warned about gross indigenous women’s rights violations in a report named ‘Missing and murdered indigenous women in British Colombia, Canada.’ Also, (already) in 1994 in the Article 9 of the Convention on the Prevention, Punishment and Eradication of Violence against Women (more known under the acronym Convention of Belem do Pará) special vulnerability of certain women is linked with their:
 …race or ethnic background or their status as migrants, refugees or displaced persons. Similar consideration shall be given to women subjected to violence while pregnant or who are disabled, of minor age, elderly, socioeconomically disadvantaged, affected by armed conflict or deprived of their freedom.
The landmark case in which the IACtHR elaborated on intersectionality was Gonzales Lluy et al. v. Ecuador (2015, para. 290):
In Talía’s case, numerous factors of vulnerability and risk of discrimination intersected that were associated with her condition as a minor, a female, a person living in poverty, and a person living with HIV. The discrimination experienced by Talía was caused not only by numerous factors, but also arose from a specific form of discrimination that resulted from the intersection of those factors; in other words, if one of those factors had not existed, the discrimination would have been different. (Emphasis added)
Although the aforementioned case was not dealing with femicide or ‘…sexual violence (it concerns the rights to life, physical integrity and education), [and] it is relevant because it defines and officializes intersectionality as a judicial approach to discrimination in the IAS, and in consistency with the UN committees.’ (p. 88)
In the following paragraphs I will discuss how intersectionality enters into the femicide line of cases and then switch my analysis to rape cases of the Commission and Court.
II.                ‘Double Vulnerability’ in Femicide Cases: the IACtHR
The first traces of the recognition of intersectionality in the context of femicides may be found in the Court’s landmark judgment Gonzáles et at. (‘Cotton Field’) v. Mexico (2009). Among other notable contributions to women’s rights adjudication, in ‘Cotton Field’ the Court pointed to the interconnection of structural ‘culture of discrimination that influenced the murders of women.' (para. 399) In this particular judgment, the IACtHR did not use the term ‘intersectionality’ per se, however, it recognized that some women were ‘double’ vulnerable, meaning that the victims suffered 'a double discrimination' because they were of the 'humble origin.' (para. 391) Moreover, it can be concluded ‘between the lines’ that the Court, besides the already mentioned fact that victims were of a ‘humble origin’, also took into account victims' sensitive ages (while ordering reparations, since two out of three victims in case were aged 15 and 17). In the Court’s words: ‘The State must pay special attention to the needs and rights of the alleged victims owing to their condition as girls who, as women, belong to a vulnerable group.’ (para. 408)
However, critics noted the Court’s insufficient reflection on the problem of intersectionality in the judgment since it was well established in numerous independent reports that most murdered and forcefully disappeared women in the infamous city of Ciudad Juárez were of a lower socio-economic class. It should also be noted, however, that the IACtHR recognized among the relevant facts that the victims of unprecedented widespread femicides in this border city were in most cases ‘young, working class, employed in the maquila sector, underprivileged, students or migrants’, but without further elaboration. (para. 122) In 2017, the Commission decided to grant admissibility to six cases of femicides (Silvia Elena Rivera Morales y otras v. Mexico) in which the victims were between the ages of 6 and 20, again committed in the city of Ciudad Juárez in the period between 1995-2003. It will be interesting to see in this somewhat ‘follow-up’ case if the Commission will pay more attention to such a justified criticism and decide to dedicate more space in its reasoning to the previously partially neglected issue of intersectionality.
Similarly to the Cotton Field judgment, in Veliz Franco et al. vs Guatemala (2014) the Court merely superficially concluded that femicide ‘victims generally lived in poor neighborhoods and engaged in low-income activities or were students.’ (para. 78) The case dealt with the Guatemalan failure to investigate the femicide of a 15-year-old girl. Again, the Court took a simpler approach and focused its analysis on the fact that girls are “particularly vulnerable to violence” (para. 134) instead of elaborating on an additional category of vulnerability: victim’s socio-economic class. In the comprehensive book Intersectionality in the Human Rights Legal Framework on Violence against Women: At the Centre or the Margins? (Cambridge University Press, 2017), Lorena Susa rightly criticized the IACtHR’s approach in both cases because it ‘emphasized the disproportionate number of murders of ‘women’ without really engaging in an analysis of whether particular ‘groups of women’ are over-represented.’ (p. 153) Recognition that murders were motivated by the victim’s gender is a praiseworthy element of the judgments, however, it seems that the Court perceived female victims as a homogenous group (except in specially assessing their age when ordering reparations). More focus on victims’ socio-economic status’ would be of added value because it is clear from the States’ inappropriate practice that authorities are conducting investigations sloppily (or even not conducting it at all!) where victims of femicides, forced disappearances and sexual violence are poor, migrant, uneducated, maquilas workers and/or prostitutes. Deeply rooted gender-based prejudices and stereotypes against those mentioned, in the eyes of authority, evidently second categories of female victims. This leads to de facto and de iure impunity or minimal punishment for many committed crimes. Moreover, such impunity further perpetuates gender-based violence against marginalized women.
To conclude, the IACtHR probably omitted discussing the interconnection between class and gender due to, as Sally Merry Engle noted in the influential book Gender violence: A Cultural Perspective (Wiley-Blackwell, 2009), ‘…difficulties of statistically measuring the impact of poverty, race and migration status on gender violence.’ (p. 123) However, such widespread and systematic violence against women should be assessed in the context of all other interrelated forms of oppressions, such as racism, homophobia and/or xenophobia (depending on the circumstances of the case).

III.             Rape Cases:
As seen in the Cotton Field and Veliz Franco judgments, I would argue that the Court and the Commission are particularly sensitive and attentive when it comes to the violation of girl’s rights since both institutions clearly recognize their special vulnerability due to age and gender. Likewise in the case V.R.P and V.P.C. v. Nicaragua, a 9-year-old girl was the victim of a gruesome sexual assault committed by her own father. The Commission inter alia noted how thesituation is exacerbated by the nature of the offence, as well as the situation of double vulnerability of V.P.R as a woman and a child.’ Since Nicaragua did not comply with the Commission’s recommendations, the case was referred to the IACtHR in 2016 and therefore it will be interesting to see if the IACtHR will focus its analysis in more depth on the issue of intersectionality. Lorena Sosa is of the opinion that: ‘The focus on the girl-child, encouraged by Article 19 of the American Convention, is the most relevant element for incorporating diversity in these cases…’ (p. 166)
While discussing numerous violations in the Fernández Ortega et alt. v. Mexico (2010) judgment, the Court recognized thespecial vulnerability of indigenous woman’ (para. 230) who was a victim of brutal rape. However, the Commission went one step further than the Court in Fernández Ortega (2009) because it highlighted that indigenous women ‘suffer from a combination of various forms of discrimination: as women, because of their ethnic or racial origin, and/or by virtue of their socio-economic status.’ (para. 179) Instead of focusing their analysis on the special vulnerability/multiple discrimination of indigenous women, in my view the more accurate terminology would be to use intersectionality since it, as Lorena Sosa pointed out, ‘…emphasizes long-term social and structural constructions of inequality’ (p. 165) which indigenous women unquestionably face. However, according to the article written by Mariana Prandini Assis Violence against Women as a Translocal Category in the Jurisprudence of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (Direito&Práxis revista, 2017), a notable contribution of the Court is that it: ‘went further to link the difficulties faced by the indigenous peoples to access justice, to the historical process of marginalization, deprivation and non-recognition within the Mexican nation state.’ (p. 1533) Likewise when assessing the victim’s consistency during testimonies, the Court was clearly well aware of the victim’s difficult personal situation from which it is easy to detect many (intersectional/structural) difficulties which Inés Fernández Ortega faced as: ‘…an indigenous woman, who lived in an isolated mountainous area, who had to walk many hours for denouncing her rape to health and legal authorities who did not speak her language...’ (para. 107)
In Rosendo Cantú (2010), the rape victim was an indigenous girl and the Court reinforced its view according to which she was at a particular risk of violence both as a minor as well as an indigenous descendant. Moreover, while ordering extensive reparations, in Rosendo Cantú and Fernández Ortega et al. v the IACtHR evidently took into account indigenous and gender perspectives which will hopefully have positive impacts on pro futuro victims of sexual violence.

IV. Conclusion:
It is clear that intersectionality in the discussed gender-based violence cases decided by the IACtHR was firstly referred to under the notion of women’s (special) vulnerability, similar to the approach taken by the Council of Europe’s (further: the CoE) Committee of Ministers which noted in the Recommendation Rec (2002)5 on the protection of women against violence that ‘women are often subjected to multiple discrimination based on their gender.’ As in Article 8 of the Convention do Belem do Pará, the CoE’s Convention on Preventing and Combating Violence against Women and Domestic Violence (more known under the acronym Istanbul Convention) also does not explicitly use the term intersectionality. It does, however, recognize the greater risk – special vulnerability- faced by certain groups of women (e.g. migrant women, women with disabilities). Some aspects of the European Court on Human Rights’ (further: the ECtHR) case-law on violence against women are slowly developing towards recognition of intersectionality (e.g. when it comes to forced sterilization of Roma women, like in N.B. v Slovakia, Application No. 29518/10, 12 June 2012, para. 96), however, the ECtHR is still reluctant to apply an intersectional lense (and consequently to use the term) even in cases where intersectionality is obviously an issue. Instead, the ECtHR refers to certain categories of victims as ‘a particularly vulnerable group’, Roma women being the most prominent example. Therefore, even when it comes to the variety of forms of violence against women where intersectionality was recognized, it can be concluded that both the Court and the Commission have much more developed case-law than their European counterpart, and furthermore, that their jurisprudence is in accordance with CEDAW Committee’s recommended standards.
Nevertheless, there is still space for further improvements with the Court’s and the Commission’s approach in this area, especially since there exists an inconsistency with the (mis)usage of terms ‘special vulnerability’ and ‘intersectionality.’ Experts like Lorena Sosa in her article Inter-American case law on femicide: Obscuring intersections? (Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights, 2017, Vol. 35(2)) noticed how ‘the Commission has shown more inclination than the Court towards the adoption of an intersectional approach, particularly in recent reports.’ (p. 102) Additionally, it is evident that there is prioritization when it comes to dealing with certain categories of intersectionality in gender-based violence cases. Some mentioned critics warned that the Court omitted an analysis of the clear interconnection between class and gender in femicide cases (Cotton Field judgment being the most prominent example). A contrario, the Court pays much more attention to the special vulnerability of girls in the context of gender-violence (including both femicide and rape cases). Certainly, the most praiseworthy aspect of the Court’s current approach to intersectionality is, as  Lorena Sosa concluded in her book: ‘Recognition of the importance of intersecting grounds…  in relation to rape of indigenous women, in which gender, indigenousness, language and, more notably, child status were addressed by the Court.’ (p. 166)
Finally, the need for firmer analysis by the Court and Commission on intersectionality in their decisions is important in order to emphasize the structural discrimination which certain groups of women are confronted with. Elaboration on intersectional causes of discrimination that marginalized women often face may have positive impacts on victims, OAS Member States and also, according to Rosa Celorio’s article The rights of women in the Inter-American System of Human Rights: Current opportunities and challenges in standard-setting (University of Miami Law Review, Vol. 65, 2011), ‘to the organs of the system to develop important concepts related to the social exclusion faced by these groups and to report on the specific barriers they face in their pursuit to justice.’ (p. 860)


References

Books:
Aldao, Martín, Clérico, Laura, Ronconi, Liliana: A Multidimensional Approach to Equality in the Inter-American Context: Redistribution, Recognition and Participatory Parity in Armin von Bogdandy et alt. (editors): Transformative Constitutionalism in Latin America: The Emergence of a New Ius Commune, Oxford University Press, 2017
Engle, Sally Merry: Gender violence: A Cultural Perspective, Wiley-Blackwell, 2009
Sosa, Lorena: Intersectionality in the Human Rights Legal Framework on Violence against Women: At the Centre or the Margins?, Cambridge University Press, 2017

Articles:
Celorio, Rosa: The rights of women in the Inter-American System of Human Rights: Current opportunities and challenges in standard-setting, University of. Miami Law Review, Vol. 65, 2011
Sosa, Lorena: Inter-American case law on femicide: Obscuring intersections?, Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights, 2017, Vol. 35(2)
Prandini Assis, Mariana: Violence against Women as a Translocal Category in the Jurisprudence of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Direito&Práxis revista, 2017
Martin Beringola, Ana: Intersectionality: A Tool for the Gender Analysis of Sexual Violence at the ICC, Amsterdam Law Forum, Vol. 9, No. 2, 2017

Treaties and General Recommendations:
CoE, Convention on Preventing and Combating Violence against Women and Domestic Violence, 2009
OAS, Inter-American Convention on the Prevention, Punishment and Eradication of Violence against Women ("Convention of Belem do Para"), 9 June 1994
CEDAW/C/GC/28, General recommendation No. 28 on the core obligations of States parties under article 2 of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, 16 December 2010
Committee of Ministers, Recommendation Rec (2002)5 on the protection of women against violence
The Commission, Missing and Murdered Indigenous Women in British Columbia, Canada, OEA/Ser.L/V/II., Doc. 30/14
Cases:
The IACtHR
Gonzales Lluy et al. v. Ecuador, 1 September 2015
Gonzales et al. v. Mexico (Cottonfields case), 16 November 2009
Veliz Franco et al. v. Guatemala, 19 May 2014
Fernández Ortega et al. v. Mexico, 30 August 2010
The Commission
V.R.P and V.P.C. v. Nicaragua, Parts of English translation available on: http://www.oas.org/en/iachr/media_center/PReleases/2016/138.asp, accessed on 3/6/2019
Application to the IACtHR in the case of Inés Fernández Ortega, May 7, 2009 (Case 12.580)
The ECtHR
N.B. v Slovakia, Application No. 29518/10, 12 June 2012
Web pages:
http://www.unwomen.org/en/news/stories/2017/2/take-five-adriana-quinones-femicide-in-latin-america, accessed on 3/7/2019
https://rfkhumanrights.org/news/iachr-femicide-admissibility, accessed on 3/6/2019

Source of the picture